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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
  v.
JEFFREY HAGGART,
                    Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Crim. Action No. 04-cr-00271-10
(Honorable James F. McClure, Jr.)
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 26, 2007
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and ALARCÓN,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 27, 2007)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2ALARCÓN, Circuit Judge.
Jeffrey Haggart appeals from the District Court’s order sentencing him to serve
120 months of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a special assessment of
$100.  Mr. Haggart contends that the District Court incorrectly assigned him two criminal
history points for separate convictions for reckless driving because such convictions
resulted only in sentences of unsupervised probation.  We will affirm because we
conclude that the District Court’s sentence was reasonable. 
I
A
Beginning on January 13, 2003, co-defendant Gregory Jones arranged through co-
defendant Shaun Jordan and Mr. Haggart to ship cocaine from Los Angeles to co-
defendant William Neidig in Pennsylvania.  Mr. Haggart packaged the cocaine in film
canisters in Los Angeles and sent them via Federal Express to Mr. Neidig.  Mr. Haggart
arranged for the shipment of at least five but less than fifteen kilograms of cocaine
powder to Mr. Neidig.    
B
On December 6, 2005, Mr. Haggart pled guilty to the charge of conspiracy to
distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  Mr. Haggart’s Presentence Report
(“PSR”) provided that Mr. Haggart had been convicted of reckless driving in Santa
Barbara, California in July of 1996 and April of 1997.  These convictions resulted in
3separate imprisonment sentences that were suspended for three years each, during which
time he was ordered to serve unsupervised probation.  In sentencing Mr. Haggart, the
District Court adopted the Sentencing Guidelines’s calculation contained in the PSR and
determined that based upon a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of
II, the Sentencing Guidelines imprisonment range was 120 to 135 months. 
The District Court rejected Mr. Haggart’s claim that his reckless driving
convictions should not be considered in computing his criminal history category because
he was sentenced to unsupervised probation.  In addition, the District Court held that,
based on the determined number of criminal history points, Mr. Haggart was not eligible
for a sentence below the statutory minimum, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).  The
District Court sentenced Mr. Haggart to a sentence of ten years.
Mr. Haggart filed a timely notice of appeal on July 11, 2006.  We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II 
A
Mr. Haggart argues that he should not receive criminal history points for either of
his reckless driving convictions because “procedural due process is entirely lacking, and
because the sentences bear the characteristics of ‘summary’ criminal violations.” 
Specifically, he notes that neither conviction involved a formal court appearance, an
4arraignment before a judge or magistrate, a preliminary hearing, or a grand jury
indictment.  In addition, Mr. Haggart raises the fact that the convictions were handled
completely by mail.   
Mr. Haggart failed to raise his procedural due process argument before the District
Court.  “This court has consistently held that it will not consider issues that are raised for
the first time on appeal.”  Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Accordingly, we decline to consider Mr. Haggart’s due process argument.
B
Mr. Haggart also contends that the District Court improperly used his prior
convictions of reckless driving in computing his criminal history points, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1(c), 4A1.2(c)(1), because those prior convictions resulted in sentences
of unsupervised probation.  “We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines and constitutional questions.”  United States
v. Lennon, 372 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1)(A), reckless driving convictions are counted when
determining a defendant’s criminal history points if “the sentence was a term of probation
of at least one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days[.]”  Mr. Haggart cites
no authority that supports his argument that reckless driving convictions resulting in
5unsupervised probation are not counted towards a defendant’s criminal history points. 
Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A).  In fact, this argument runs counter to the plain language of
the Sentencing Guidelines.  See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), Application Note 4
(“‘criminal justice sentence’ means a sentence countable under § 4A1.2 . . . having a
custodial or supervisory component, although active supervision is not required for this
item to apply.  For example, a term of unsupervised probation would be included . . . .”). 
Section  4A1.1(d) of the Sentencing Guidelines advises that a court should, “[a]dd 2
[criminal history] points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any
criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment,
work release, or escape status.”  Although § 4A1.1(d) presents somewhat different issues
from those involved here under § 4A1.2(c)(1), the term “probation” should be given the
same meaning under both sections as both relate to § 4A1.2.
Additionally, other United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have concluded that
the term “probation” under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1) encompasses unsupervised probation. 
See Harris v. United States, 204 F.3d 681, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that, in
Ohio, a sentence designated as “PNC” is the “functional equivalent of unsupervised
probation” and thus qualifies as a countable term of probation under § 4A1.2(c)(1)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Scott, 19 F.3d 1238, 1246 (7th Cir.
1994) (concluding that “a one-year conditional discharge” was a “prior sentence” under §
64A1.2(c)(1) because it was a “non-supervisory form of probation”); United States v.
Lloyd, 43 F.3d 1183, 1187-88 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that “conditional discharge” is
the functional equivalent of “unsupervised probation,” which falls under the definition of
“probation” under § 4A1.1(d) and, thus, also under § 4A1.2(c)(1)).  Mr. Haggart’s
probation sentences, regardless of how extensively supervised, exceeded one year and,
thus, were properly counted by the District Court in computing his criminal history points
under § 4A1.2(c)(1). 
C
Mr. Haggart further maintains that he should have been granted a sentence below
the statutory minimum of ten years, pursuant to the “safety valve” provision of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f).  Section 3553(f) authorizes the issuance of a Guidelines sentence without
regard to the statutory mandatory minimum provided the sentencing court determines that
the defendant meets the following five criteria: 
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history
point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; 
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of
violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or
induce another participant to do so) in connection with the
offense; 
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury
to any person; 
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor of others in the offense, . . . and was not engaged
in a continuing criminal enterprise . . .; and 
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the
7defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the
offense or offenses that were part of the same course of
conduct or of a common scheme or plan[.] 
In light of our conclusion that Mr. Haggart had more than one criminal history point, his
request for a sentence below the statutory minimum appears to be foreclosed under the
first requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
